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Legal Limits on Food Labelling Law: 
Comparative analysis of the EU and the USA. 
Eva van der Zee 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The objective of this study is to explore to what extent freedom of 
expression should protect food businesses against government 
intervention with corporate communications on food labels. A 
functional comparative method was used to analyse the objective. 
It was found that expression on food labels should be considered 
primarily commercial in nature. In the USA some food labelling 
regulations are considered inconsistent with the freedom of 
commercial expression. EU courts seem to uphold government 
restrictions to commercial expression in all cases, especially when 
restrictions are based on protection of human health. It can be 
concluded that food businesses should only be able to claim free 
speech rights on food labels when it is of importance to the public 
or consumers. 
 
Key words: Freedom of expression, free speech, food labelling, 
corporate, constitutional rights 
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1. Introduction 
Practice in the USA shows that some food labelling 
regulations could be considered inconsistent with the 
freedom of expression of food businesses.1 Recent trends in 
the EU2 require investigation whether the right to freedom 
of expression of food businesses could limit the government 
need to regulate food information.  
The objective of this study was to explore to what 
extent freedom of expression3 should protect food 
businesses against government intervention with 
communications on food labels. A functional comparative 
                                                 
1 See for example, International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy, 92 
F.3d 67 (2nd Cir. 1996); Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 
1999), rehearing den., 172 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Pearson I”); 
Whitaker v. Thompson 248 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002); International 
Dairy Foods Association and Organic Trade Association v. Boggs, 622 
F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2010). 
2 In Recital 44 of Regulation (EU) No 609/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on food intended for 
infants and young children, food for special medical purposes, and total 
diet replacement for weight control it is stated that “[t]his Regulation 
does not affect the obligation to respect fundamental rights and 
fundamental legal principles, including the freedom of expression, as 
enshrined in Article 11, in conjunction with Article 52, of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and in other relevant 
provisions.” Furthermore, ECJ 6 September 2012 Case C-544/10 
Weintor (hereinafter: Weintor) was the first, and so far only, ECJ-case 
concerning a fundamental rights challenge against a food labelling law. 
3 There seems to be no difference between the term ‘freedom of 
expression’ used by civil law systems and ‘freedom of speech’ used by 
common law systems. The two terms will, therefore, be used 
interchangeably throughout this article. See Eric Barendt (2011), 
Freedom of Expression, in: Michel Rosenfeld & Adrás Sajó (2011), ‘The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law’, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 893. 
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method was used to analyse this objective.4 To achieve this 
objective, first (1) the different tools used by the examined 
legal systems to ensure free speech protection were 
considered. In order to do this, it was first considered 
whether fundamental rights in general and free speech in 
particular, are protected in the legal system at issue. If this 
was the case, it was then considered whether and why this 
protection includes food businesses. It was furthermore 
considered whether this protection is extended to food 
labels. When freedom of expression applies to 
communications on food labels it was considered which 
limitations can be set to such free speech protection. 
Second (2), the different approaches to free speech 
protection on food labels in the USA and the EU were 
compared. Finally (3), it was discussed to what extent the 
functions of free speech allow free speech protection of 
communications on food labels. 
 
The analysis is centred on five situations in which 
government regulation could potentially be considered 
inconsistent with the freedom of expression: 
 
1. Cooked-up is a food business producing canned 
dinners, such as Mac’n’Cheese (a canned macaroni 
and cheese dinner). Cooked-up wants to label 
Mac’n’Cheese with the statement that it ‘contains all 
the nutrients needed for a long and healthy life’. The 
government bans this information as it is considered 
to be false.  
                                                 
4 J. Gordley (2012), ‘The Functional Method’, in: P.G. Monetari, Methods 
of Comparative Law, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 113. 
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2. Corn Rebel is a food businesses producing GM-free 
sweet corn. According to Corn Rebel genetically 
engineered crops and food products are unsafe for 
human consumption and hazardous for the 
environment. Corn Rebel wants to disclose on its food 
label that its sweet corn is ‘GM-free’ to strengthen the 
political debate against GM foods. The government 
prohibits the claim, because it finds that the claim 
confuses consumers, as there is no sufficient scientific 
evidence that GM products differ compositionally from 
non-GM products. 
 
3. True-blue is a food business producing 
Blueberrylicious (blueberry flavoured jelly beans with 
added Vitamin C). They want to disclose on the food 
label of Blueberrylicious that it contains ‘added 
Vitamin C’. Although the government considers it 
truthful information, it is nonetheless prohibited 
because the government found that the statement will 
contribute to the problem of obesity as it will 
encourage consumers to eat unhealthy food products. 
 
4. My Goodness is a food business producing dairy 
products containing bifidus. Based on minority 
scientific opinion My Goodness wants to disclose on 
the food label that ‘the consumption of bifidus eases 
the digestive system’. The government prohibits the 
claim because there is no significant scientific 
evidence supporting the claim. 
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5. Humble Honey is a food business producing honey. 
Their honey might be inadvertently contaminated with 
genetically modified pollen. The government compels 
Humble Honey to label its honey as being 
‘contaminated with genetically modified pollen’ to 
enable consumers to make an informed choice. 
Humble Honey does not want to disclose such 
information as they worry it may negatively affect 
their sales. 
The legal systems of the EU and the USA were subject to 
the comparison. These cases encompass legal systems from 
(common and civil) legal cultures at comparable stages of 
cultural, political and economic development,5 but have 
fundamentally different labelling requirements for food 
products.  
The challenges involved with conducting comparative 
legal research were controlled by extensively consulting 
experts in constitutional law and food law in each of the two 
legal systems. This will prevent systematic differences in 
interpretation and missing out on certain rules and 
considerations in the foreign system.  
The study was restricted to freedom of expression on 
the physical label on the food product. All other types of 
expression concerned with the food product, such as online 
information, were excluded. Future research may aim at 
more comprehensive study concerning how online food 
information is, could, and should be regulated in accordance 
with freedom of expression. 
                                                 
5 I have selected the cases based on the “most similar cases” logic, 
described in Ran Hirschl (2005), ‘The Question of Case Selection in 
Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 125, pp. 133-9. 
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Government regulations comparable to food labelling 
regulations were included when these regulations touch 
upon similar legal dilemmas. Examples of such government 
regulation include case law concerning regulation prohibiting 
or limiting advertisement, sponsorship and/or labelling of 
tobacco products, case law considering labelling of diet 
supplements, and case law concerning labelling of alcoholic 
beverages.6 
 
2. Free Speech Protection in the European Union 
The right to freedom of expression in the EU is enshrined in 
Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (hereinafter: EU Charter). The EU Charter 
was proclaimed in December 2000, but did not acquire 
legally binding status7 until an amendment of Article 6 TEU 
in 2009.8  
                                                 
6 In the EU, alcoholic beverages are considered to be food products. In 
the US, however, alcoholic beverages are regulated primarily by the 
Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, and not by the Food and Drug 
Authority.  
7 Although the ECJ already cited the EU Charter before, see e.g. 
Parliament v. Council, C-540/03, 27 June 2006. Also advocates general 
already discussed the EU Charter (See e.g. Opinion of A.G. Alber in Case 
C-340/99, TNTTraco, [2001] ECR I-4109; Opinion of A.G. Tizzano in 
Case C-173/99, BECTU, [2001] ECR I-4881; Opinion of A.G. Mischo in 
Case C-122 & 125/99 P, D and Sweden v. Council, [2001] ECR I-4319; 
Opinion of A.G. Jacobs in Case C-270/99 P, Z v. Parliament, [2001] ECR 
I-9197; Opinion of A.G. Stix-Hackl in Case C-49/00, Commission v. 
Italy, [2001] ECR I-8575; Opinion of A.G. Jacobs in Case C-377/98, The 
Netherlands v. Council, [2001] ECR I-7079; Opinion of A.G. Léger in 
Case C-353/99 P, Council v. Hautala, [2001] ECR I-9565; Opinion ofA.G. 
Mischo in Case C-20&64/00, Booker Aquaculture Ltd v. Scottish 
Ministers, [2003] ECR I-7411; Opinion of A.G Ruiz-Jarabo in Case C-
208/00, Überseering, [2002] ECR I-9919; Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo in 
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Article 11 EU Charter stipulates that:  
 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This 
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers.”  
 
The meaning and scope of the EU Charter rights are 
determined by case law of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), and may also be determined by case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)9 without thereby 
                                                                                                                            
Case C-466/00, Arben Kaba v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, [2003] ECR I-2219. Opinion of A.G. Alber in Case C-63/01 
in Evans, [2003] ECR I-14447; Opinion of A.G. Stix-Hackl in Case C-
36/02, Omega, [2004] ECR I-9609; Opinion of A.G. Poiares Maduro in 
Case C-181/03 P, Nardone, [2005] ECR I-199; Opinion of A.G. Kokott in 
Case C-387/02, Berlusconi and Others, [2005] ECR I-3565; Opinion of 
A.G. Jacobs in Case C-347/03, Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
and ERSA, [2005] ECR I-3785); Furthermore, the EU Charter gained 
momentum in secondary law (E.g. Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 
September 2003 on the right to family reunification, recital 2; Council 
Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle 
of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply 
of goods and services, recital 4). 
8 The amended Article 6(1) TEU states that the EU ‘recognises the 
rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (...) which shall have the same legal value 
as the Treaties’.  
9 The ECtHR is a supranational or international court established by the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR is an 
international treaty, drafted within the Council of Europe, now including 
47 members that was formed after the Second World War in an attempt 
to unify Europe. Ten countries founded the Council of Europe on 5 May 
1949: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, 
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adversely affecting the autonomy of Union law and of that of 
the ECJ.10 Furthermore, in so far as the EU Charter contains 
rights which correspond11 to rights guaranteed by the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the 
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as 
those laid down by the ECHR.12 Whether a right has the 
                                                                                                                            
Sweden, the United Kingdom and The Netherlands. Today, the Council 
of Europe covers almost the entire European continent, with its 47 
member countries: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, 
San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. The 
Council of Europe remains entirely independent and separate from the 
EU, and has no powers in prescribing law to its members. The EU is not 
a member to the ECHR. 
10 5th recital of the EU Charter Preamble; Explanations relating to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17; concerning 
explanation to Article 52(3), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:303:0017:0035
:EN:PDF; In Opinion Pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU - Draft 
International Agreement - Accession of the European Union to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms - Compatibility of the Draft Agreement with the 
EU and FEU Treaties, Opinion 2/13 (Opinion of the Full Court, Dec. 18, 
2014) restated the autonomy of Union law and the ECJ. 
11 The Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
[2007] OJ C303/17; concerning explanation to Article 52(3), explain 
which EU Charter rights correspond to ECHR rights. 
12 Article 52(3) EU Charter. The reference to the ECHR also includes the 
Protocols to the ECHR. See, Explanations relating to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17; concerning explanation to 
Article 52(3), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:303:0017:0035
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same meaning and scope to those guaranteed by the ECHR 
is elaborated upon in the explanations relating to the EU 
Charter.13 According to the explanations Article 11 EU 
Charter has the same meaning and scope as Article 10 
ECHR.14 Although the explanations do not have the status of 
law, “they are a valuable tool of interpretation intended to 
clarify the provisions of the Charter”.15 Furthermore, three 
                                                                                                                            
:EN:PDF. The EU Charter also includes a large number of social and 
economic rights derived from the European Social Charter (ESC). The 
ESC is a treaty drafted by the Council of Europe in 1961 and it was 
revised in 1996. The ESC only asks from the State Parties to submit 
reports indicating how they implement the provisions of the ESC to the 
European Committee of Social Rights (Article 21 and 22 ECR as 
amended by the 1991 Turin Protocol). Any decision the ESC takes based 
on these reports are not binding on the State Parties (Article 28 ECR as 
amended by the 1991 Turin Protocol; Article 8 and 9 Additional Protocol 
to the European Social Charter (1995)). The ECtHR has had, due to the 
binding nature of its judgments, a much greater impact on the rights 
enshrined in the ECHR, than the ESC has had on the rights enshrined in 
the ESC. The rights enshrined in the ECHR are, therefore, more 
developed than the rights enshrined in the ESC.  
13 Articles 2, 4, 5(1)+(2), 6, 7, 9, 10(1), 11, 12(1), 14(1)+(3), 17, 
19(1)+(2), 47(2)+(3), 48, 49(1) and 50 all correspond to the ECHR or 
its protocols. See Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights [2007] OJ C303/17, explanation on Article 11- Freedom of 
expression and information, pp. 17-18, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:303:0017:0035
:EN:PDF 
14 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ 
C303/17; p. 18 http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:303:0017:0035
:EN:PDF. 
15 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ 
C303/17; http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:303:0017:0035
:EN:PDF 
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references in EU primary law can be found that confirm that 
the EU Charter has to be interpreted with due regard to the 
explanations (Article 52(7) EU Charter; fifth recital to the 
preamble of the EU Charter; Article 6(1) TEU).16 The ECJ 
indeed also appears to follow the explanations.17  
According to the explanations the level of protection 
afforded by the EU Charter to rights that have the same 
meaning and scope to those guaranteed by the ECHR may 
not be lower than guaranteed by the ECHR.18 EU law may, 
however, provide “more extensive protection”.19 This 
suggests that the EU Charter interprets the ECHR as a 
minimum standard of protection, but not necessarily as a 
maximum.20  
                                                 
16 Weiβ, W. (2012), ‘EU Human Rights Protection After Lisbon’, in: 
Trybus, M. & Rubini, L. (eds.), The Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of 
European Law Policy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 224. 
17 ECJ Case C-279-09, DEB, judgment of 22 December 2010, paras 32, 
35-6; ECJ Case C-283/11, judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 
22 January 2013, para. 42; ECJ Case C-334/12, Judgment of the Court 
(Fourth Chamber) of 28 February 2013, para 42; ECJ Case C-617/10, 
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 26 February 2013, para. 20. 
18 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ 
C303/17; p. 17, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:303:0017:0035
:EN:PDF 
19 Article 52(3) EU Charter. This was reconfirmed by CONV 354/02, Final 
Report of Working Group II, 22 October 2002, p. 7. 
20 Biondi, A., Eeckhout, P., & Ripley, S. (2012). EU Law after Lisbon. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 163. 
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2.1. Scope of Free Speech Protection of Food 
Businesses in the EU 
There is no dispute that companies and corporate entities 
enjoy fundamental rights protection in the EU.21 It is not 
clear, however, whether companies are excluded from 
fundamental right protection of strictly personal 
fundamental rights, such as the right to life (Article 2 EU 
Charter) or personal integrity (Article 3 EU Charter) might 
be excluded, and arguably freedom of expression.22 It would 
be practical if for strictly personal fundamental rights only 
natural persons could be beneficiaries. The ECJ, however, 
does not rely on this test.23 
The proceedings of the legitimacy of the Tobacco 
Advertising Directive24 in 2000 provided an opportunity for 
the ECJ to comment on the scope of free speech protection 
                                                 
21 Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-301/04 P 
Commission v SGLCarbon [2006] ECR I-5915, para 64; Case C-249/09 
Novo Nordisk AS v Ravimiamet, (Advocate General’s opinion 19 October 
2010), para. 44; (ECJ Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 
1125, paras 4 ff; National Panasonic [1980] ECR 2033, paras 17 ff; 
Schrader [1989] ECR 2237, para 15. 
22 See also Rengeling, H.W. & Szczekalla, P. (2004), Grundrechte in der 
Europäischen Union: Charta der Grundrechte und allgemeine 
Rechtsgrundsätze, Koln: Heymanns, para 344; Ehlers, D. (2007), 
European Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, Berlin: De Gruyter Recht, 
p. 385). According Rengeling, H.W. & Szczekalla, P. (2004), 
Grundrechte in der Europäischen Union: Charta der Grundrechte und 
allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze, Koln: Heymanns, para 390. 
23 See Ehlers, D. (2007), European Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, 
Berlin: De Gruyter Recht, p. 385-6. 
24 Directive 98/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
issued on 6 July 1998, on the approximation of the laws, regulations, 
and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the 
advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products. 
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for companies. In this case, Germany sought annulment of 
the Tobacco Advertisement Directive. The legal challenge 
raised seven different possible grounds for the annulment of 
the Directive.25 One of the grounds was the violation of the 
right to freedom of commercial expression. The judgment 
did not address the issue of compatibility with the right to 
freedom of expression, because the ECJ accepted the lack of 
a proper legal basis as ground for annulment of the 
Directive. Advocate General Fennelly, however, assessed 
the compatibility of the Directive limiting advertising and 
sponsorship of tobacco products26 with the right to freedom 
of expression. He argues that: 
 
“Personal rights are recognized as being fundamental 
in character, not merely because of their instrumental, 
social functions, but also because they are necessary 
for the autonomy, dignity and personal development 
of individuals. Thus, individuals' freedom to promote 
commercial activities derives not only from their right 
to engage in economic activities and the general 
commitment, in the Community context, to a market 
economy based upon free competition, but also from 
their inherent entitlement as human beings freely to 
express and receive views on any topic, including the 
                                                 
25 See for more information S. Weatherill (2011), ‘The limits of 
legislative harmonisation ten years after tobacco advertising: how the 
Court’s case law has become a “drafting guide”’, 12 German Law Journal 
821. 
26 Directive 98/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
issued on 6 July 1998, on the approximation of the laws, regulations, 
and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the 
advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products. 
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merits of the goods or services which they market or 
purchase.”27  
 
Although he does not directly address whether companies as 
such should be beneficiaries of free speech protection, it 
follows from his submissions that he finds that in this case 
the companies which manufacture tobacco products are 
subject to free speech protection, even though he considers 
it to be a personal right. 
The ECtHR elaborated extensively on free speech 
protection. Whether corporate persons are beneficiaries to 
the right to freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 10 
ECHR was discussed for the first time by the ECtHR in 
Autronic AG v Switzerland in 1990. This interpretation has 
become settled case law of the ECtHR.28 The ECtHR held 
that:  
 
“In the Court’s view, neither Autronic AG’s legal status 
as a limited company nor the fact that its activities 
were commercial nor the intrinsic nature of freedom of 
expression can deprive Autronic AG of the protection 
of Article 10 (…) The Article (…) applies to ‘everyone’, 
whether natural or legal persons.”29  
 
Food businesses would, thus, probably be considered 
beneficiaries to Article 11 EU Charter. 
                                                 
27 Germany v parliament and council, Case C-376/98 (Advocate 
General’s opinion 15 June 2000), para. 154. 
28 Casado Coca v Spain Ser A 285-A (1994) (Court), para 35; See 
Emberland, M. (2006). The Human Rights of Companies. Exploring the 
Structure of ECHR Protection. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 130. 
29 Autronic AG v Switzerland (1990), Series A, No. 178, para. 47. 
53 
 
14 
 
 
2.2. Scope of Free Speech Protection of 
Communications on Food Labels in the EU 
Although food businesses most likely will be considered 
beneficiaries to the right to freedom of expression enshrined 
in Article 11 EU Charter, it should still be examined whether 
communications on the food label could also be considered 
‘expression’ under these articles, especially since in 2013 
the EU included freedom of expression in a food labelling 
regulation.30  
There is not yet a clear ECJ judgment that would be 
relevant for expressions on the food label. Resource could 
be had to the case law of the ECtHR. ‘Expression’ in the 
context of the ECHR is, at least, an expressive statement 
represented in written or spoken words, pictures, images 
and expressive conduct, which has an element of public 
outreach.31 Besides the expression itself, also the means for 
its production and for its communication, such as print,32 
radio33 and television broadcasting,34 artistic creations,35 
                                                 
30 In Recital 44 of Regulation (EU) No 609/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on food intended for 
infants and young children, food for special medical purposes, and total 
diet replacement for weight control it is stated that “[t]his Regulation 
does not affect the obligation to respect fundamental rights and 
fundamental legal principles, including the freedom of expression, as 
enshrined in Article 11, in conjunction with Article 52, of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and in other relevant 
provisions.” 
31 Emberland, M. (2006). The Human Rights of Companies. Exploring the 
Structure of ECHR Protection. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 117. 
32 Handyside v UK A 24 (1976). 
33 Groppera Radio AG v Switzerland A 173 (1990). 
34 Autronic v Switzerland A 178 (1983). 
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film36 and electronic information systems, is protected.37 
Furthermore, the ECtHR stated in Markt Intern Verlag v 
Germany that “Article 10(1) (…) does not apply solely to 
certain types of information or ideas or forms of 
expression”.38 All39 forms of expression are, thus, protected 
by Article 10(1) ECHR.  
From this it could be concluded that corporate 
communications on the food label, i.e. the statements by 
Cooked-up, Corn Rebel, True-blue, and My Goodness on 
their food labels should thus also be protected by Article 
10(1) ECHR, and may, therefore, also be protected by 
Article 11 EU Charter. 
Whether Humble Honey, who is compelled to label its 
honey as being ‘contaminated with genetically modified 
pollen’ to enable consumers to make an informed choice, 
would enjoy free speech protection in the EU is less clear. 
The ECJ never discussed such a negative right to freedom of 
expression. Also the ECtHR have not explicitly taken a 
position on whether or not the negative right to freedom of 
                                                                                                                            
35 Müller v Switzerland A 133 (1988). 
36 Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria A 295-A (1994). 
37 Harris, D., O'Boyle, M., & Warbick, C. (1995). Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. London: Butterworths, p. 378-9. 
38 Markt Intern Verlag v Germany Ser A 195 (1989) (Court), para. 26. 
39 Hate speech might, however, be excluded from protection. See 
Keane, David, ‘Attacking Hate Speech under Article 17 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 
Vol. 25, No. 4, 2007, pp. 641–663 for arguments in favour of excluding 
hate speech from free speech protection; Cannie, H. & Voorhoof, D, ‘The 
Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the European Human Rights 
Convention: An Added Value for Democracy and Human Rights 
Protection’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 29, No. 1, 
2011, pp. 54-83 for arguments against excluding hate speech from free 
speech protection. 
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expression is protected by Article 10 ECHR. However, the 
European Commission on Human Rights (ECmHR)40 asserted 
in Goodwin v. United Kingdom that:  
“There are circumstances in which a  "negative right" 
is to be implied in Article 10 (Art. 10) not to be 
compelled to give information or to state an 
opinion.”41  
Goodwin v. United Kingdom, however, concerned the 
compulsion of a journalist to disclose its sources. The ECtHR 
has frequently stressed the importance of the press as 
‘public watchdog’ to impart information and ideas of public 
interest.42 It is, therefore, not self-evident that disclosure 
requirements on food labels would also enjoy negative free 
speech protection.  
2.3. Limitations to the Free Speech Rights of 
Food Businesses on Food Labels in the EU 
Article 52(1) EU Charter is the overarching limitation clause 
of the EU Charter, and closely follows the case-law of the 
ECJ. When applying Article 52(1) EU Charter to Article 11 EU 
Charter, the explanations relating to the EU Charter indicate 
                                                 
40 Initially the ECtHR and the ECmHR where part of the international 
judicial mechanism with jurisdiction to find against States that breach 
the rights enshrined in the ECHR. The task of the ECmHR was to screen 
the incoming cases for admissibility (see former Article 28 ECHR) until it 
was made defunct in 1998 and its tasks then were taken over by the 
ECtHR. See Emberland, M. (2006). The Human Rights of Companies. 
Exploring the Structure of ECHR Protection. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 9. 
41 Paragraph 48 Application No. 17488/90, Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 
report of 1 March 1994. 
42 Eric Barendt (2005) Freedom of Speech, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 66, refers to Observer and Guardian v UK (1992) 14 EHRR 
153, para. 59; Jersild v. Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1. 
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that due regard should be given to the limitation clause of 
the freedom of expression of the ECHR, Article 10(2) ECHR43 
and that government limitations imposed on the right to 
freedom of expression of Article 11 EU Charter may “not 
exceed those provided for in Article 10(2) [ECHR]”.44 Article 
10(2) ECHR could, therefore, be taken into account when 
assessing the limits to free speech protection in the EU. A 
side-by-side comparison of key phrases from Article 52(1) 
EU Charter and Article 10(2) ECHR shows that the articles 
are very similar.  The EU charter, however, seems to 
provide a little more protection than the ECHR (table 1).  
 
Table 1. Limitation Clauses in the EU 
Article Article 52(1) EU Charter: 
general limitation clause 
Article 10(2) 
ECHR: specific 
limitation clause 
for the freedom 
of expression 
Conten
t 
 provided for by law  
 respect the essence of 
those rights and 
freedoms.  
 Subject to the principle 
of proportionality 
 prescribed 
by law  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 The rights and freedoms enshrined in the ECHR each have their own 
limitation clause, instead of one overarching limitation clause as in the 
EU Charter.  
44 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ 
C303/17, explanation on Article 11- Freedom of expression and 
information, para 1, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:303:0017:0035
:EN:PDF. 
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 necessary  
 genuinely meet 
objectives of 
general interest 
OR need to 
protect the rights 
and freedoms of 
others 
 necessary 
 legitimate 
public aim 
(exhaustivel
y listed) 
 
 
So far companies have not challenged a government 
regulation limiting content on product labels based on the 
right to freedom of expression before the ECtHR or the ECJ. 
Nonetheless, the limiting clauses for protection following ECJ 
case-law and Article 52(1) EU Charter could play out as 
follows.  
 
(1) Limitation must be provided for by law 
In cases where it involves food labelling law this condition is 
met by definition. Within the European Union many legally 
binding rules, mainly Regulations but also Directives,45 
relate to the food label.46 This requirement is similarly 
                                                 
45 Regulations are defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union as having general application and ‘binding in its entirety 
and directly applicable in Member States’ (Article 288 TEU). 
46 Examples are Regulation 1169/2011 on the provision of food 
information to consumers; Regulation 834/2007 on organic production 
and labelling of organic products; Regulation 1829/2003 on genetically 
modified food and feed; Regulation 1830/2003 concerning the 
traceability and labelling of genetically modified organisms and the 
traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically 
modified organisms; Regulation 1924/2006 on the nutrition and health 
claims made on foods; and Regulation 1760/2000 establishing a system 
for the identification and registration of bovine animals and regarding 
the labelling of beef and beef products.  
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stipulated in Article 10(2) ECHR which specifies that the 
government interference must be prescribed by law, 
meaning that, at a minimum, the interference should be 
authorized by a specific national, European or international 
legal rule or regime.47  
 
(2) Limitation must respect the essence of the rights and 
freedoms at issue  
Case-law of the ECJ indicates that interferences with the 
fundamental rights of the EU may not impair the very 
essence of those rights.48 The wording of Article 52(1) EU 
Charter is based on the case-law of the ECJ, which holds 
that “restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of 
fundamental rights (...) provided that those restrictions (...) 
do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, 
disproportionate and unreasonable interference undermining 
the very substance of those rights”.49 Adherence to the 
essence of a fundamental right, however, “does not require 
more than the preservation of all basic guarantees which 
emanate from the right in question”.50 It could be argued, 
therefore, that some food labelling regulations affects the 
essence of the right to freedom of expression (Article 11 EU 
Charter) by prohibiting a form of expression. The exact 
essence of free speech according to the ECJ is, however, yet 
unclear.  
                                                 
47 Harris, D., O'Boyle, M., & Warbick, C. (2007). Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (2 ed.). London: Butterworths, p. 345, 
Silver v UK A 61 (1983); 5 EHRR 347, para 86. 
48 ECJ Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609, para 18. 
49 Case C-292/97, 13 April 2000, para. 53. 
50 Dirk Ehlers (2007), “General Principles” in: Dirk Ehlers (ed.), 
European Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, Berlin: De Gruyter Recht, 
p. 393.  
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(3) Subject to the principle of proportionality 
The principle of proportionality requires that measures 
adopted by EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what 
is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the 
objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in 
question. As such the limitation should be necessary (see 
3.1. below), and genuinely meet objectives of general 
interests or the need to protect the rights and freedom of 
others (see 3.2. below).  
 
(3.1) The limitation must be necessary 
According to the ECJ the necessity-requirement implies that 
the limitation should be the least onerous option of the 
available options. 51 The ECJ had not yet elaborated on this 
requirement, although Advocate General Fennelly argues 
that when an EU measure restricts freedom of commercial 
expression the EU legislator should: 
 
“be obliged to satisfy the Court that it had reasonable 
grounds for adopting the measure in question in the 
public interest. In concrete terms, it should supply 
coherent evidence that the measure will be effective in 
achieving the public interest objective invoked (...) 
and that less restrictive measures would not have 
been equally effective”.52  
 
                                                 
51 See ECJ Case C-283/11, judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 
22 January 2013, para. 50.  
52 Germany v parliament and council, Case C-376/98 (Advocate 
General’s opinion 15 June 2000), para. 159. 
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Advocate General Jääskinen argued that in commercial 
matters the EU legislator has a wide discretion in assessing 
the level of public health protection and is not required to 
restrict itself to a minimum necessity to protect freedom of 
expression.53 Fennelly adds nuance by stating that “[t]he 
more restrictive the effects, the greater is the onus on the 
legislator to show that a less burdensome measure would 
not have sufficed”. Fennelly suggests that the “evidence 
required to justify a restriction will depend on the nature of 
the claim made,”54 because “[e]videntiary requirements 
may be less strict where public health is at stake”55, 
implying that public health by definition gives strong support 
for any type of restriction. This is in line with the ECtHR 
which held in two cases concerning tobacco advertising that 
“overriding considerations of public health, on which the 
State and the European Union have, moreover, legislated, 
may take precedence over economic concerns, and even 
over certain fundamental rights such as freedom of 
expression”.56  
                                                 
53 Case C-249/09 Novo Nordisk AS v Ravimiamet, (Advocate General’s 
opinion 19 October 2010), para 50. He refers to Robert Alexy: ‘On 
Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison’, Ratio Juris Vol.16 
No 4. 2003 (433-449), p. 440. 
54 Germany v parliament and council, Case C-376/98 (Advocate 
General’s opinion 15 June 2000), para. 160. 
55 Germany v parliament and council, Case C-376/98 (Advocate 
General’s opinion 15 June 2000), para. 161. 
56 Translation from Case C-249/09 Novo Nordisk AS v Ravimiamet, 
(Advocate General’s opinion 19 October 2010), para 46. The cases are 
only accessible in French. See Société de Conception de Presse et 
d'Edition et Ponson c. France, March 6, 2009, ECHR; and Hachette 
Filipacchi Presse Automobile et Dupuy c. France, March 5, 2009, ECHR: 
“Ainsi, des considérations primordiales de santé publique, sur lesquelles 
l’Etat et l’Union européenne ont d’ailleurs légiféré, peuvent primer sur 
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Limiting false commercial speech, such as Cooked-up’s 
false claim that its canned macaroni and cheese dinner 
‘contains all the nutrients needed for a long and healthy 
life’, will most likely be considered necessary. It may be 
different for Corn Rebel’s claim that its sweet corn is being 
‘GM-free’, True-blue’s claim that Vitamin C is added to its 
Blueberrylicious treats, or My Goodness’s claim that ‘the 
consumption of bifidus eases the digestive system’. It could 
well be that adding disclaimers (for example for Corn Rebel: 
‘No significant difference has been shown GM corn and non-
GM corn’; for True-blue: ‘Although the treats contain 
Vitamin C they should still be eaten in moderation’; and for 
My Goodness: ‘This claim is based on minority scientific 
evidence’) would be preferred, being the least onerous 
option of the available options, as long as it is equally 
effective as banning the information altogether. 
The ECJ did already prefer disclaimers over a 
prohibition with respect to the free movement of goods. In 
the Cassis de Dijon ruling57 and the Beer Purity-case58 the 
governments invoked consumer protection to restrict trade 
of certain products.59 The ECJ found that disclaimers to the 
product in question were preferred, because they were less 
restrictive to trade and had the same effectiveness as 
prohibiting trade of the product altogether.60 It is likely that 
                                                                                                                            
des impératifs économiques, et même certains droits fondamentaux 
comme la liberté d’expression.”  
57 Case 120/78 [1979] ECR 649. 
58 Case 178/84 [1987] ECR 1227. 
59 Case 178/84 [1987] ECR 1227. 
60 See further on this information paradigm Kai Purnhagen (2014), “The 
Virtue of Cassis de Dijon 25 Years Later—It Is Not Dead, It Just Smells 
Funny”, in: Purnhagen/Rott, Varieties of European Economic Law and 
Regulation, New York et al: Springer, p. 329-332. 
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the ECJ would adopt a similar approach when the 
fundamental right to freedom of expression is limited.  
The necessity requirement can also be found in Article 
10(2) ECHR which holds that any interference to freedom of 
expression must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’. 
According to the ECtHR interference would be ‘necessary in 
a democratic society’ when the interference corresponds to 
a pressing social need and that the interference is 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.61 Furthermore, 
the reasons for the interference must be relevant and 
sufficient. In assessing whether and to what extent 
government interference is necessary the governmental 
authorities have the ‘margin of appreciation’.62 The margin 
of appreciation is not unlimited and could even be reduced 
to zero. The ECtHR can give a final ruling on whether 
government interference is reconcilable with freedom of 
expression.63 Relevant for the purpose of this study is that 
the width of the margin of appreciation is wider when the 
expression is considered to be commercial in nature rather 
than political. Thus, when the statements by Corn Rebel are 
considered political in nature, the width of the margin of 
appreciation is wider than the overtly commercial 
statements by Cooked-up, True-blue, and My Goodness 
The ECtHR defines commercial expression as “inciting 
the public to purchase a particular product”.64 Commercial 
expression is aimed at enhancing economic interests of 
                                                 
61 Olsson v Sweden (A 130 (1988); 11 EHRR 259 para 67 PC. 
62 Handyside v UK (A 24 (1976); 1 EHRR 737 paras 48-9 PC. 
63 Handyside, para. 49. 
64 Verein gegen Tierfabrieken v Switzerland (24699/94) (2001) (ECtHR) 
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individuals and businesses.65 According to the ECtHR 
political expression concerns the speaker’s “participation in 
a debate affecting the general interest”66 or reflects 
“controversial opinions pertaining to modern society in 
general”.67 For example, expression that is considered to 
contribute to public debate, even when it boosts the 
businesses of the speaker, should not be classified as 
commercial expression.68   
The ECtHR, furthermore, made a distinction between 
‘pure’ commercial expression and commercial expression 
with ‘political overtones’69 ‘Purely’ commercial expression 
has no political overtones and is subject to the lenient Markt 
Intern Standard.70 The Markt Intern Standard implies that 
the ECtHR must “confine its review to the question whether 
the measures taken on the national level are justifiable in 
principle and proportionate”.71 To establish whether such 
interference would be proportionate the ECtHR must “weigh 
the requirements of the protection of the reputation and the 
rights of others against the publication of the information”.72 
When commercial expression concerns an ongoing political 
debate commercial expression may be considered to have 
                                                 
65 Harris, D., O'Boyle, M., & Warbick, C. (2007). Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (2 ed.). London: Butterworths, p. 461. 
66 Hertel v Switzerland Reports 1998-VI (1999) 28 EHRR534 § 47 
67 VGT Vereingegen Tierfobriken (n47) § 70. 
68 Barthold v. Germany (1985) 7 EHRR 383. 
69 See also Emberland, M. (2006). The Human Rights of Companies. 
Exploring the Structure of ECHR Protection. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 165 and 171. 
70 See also Emberland, M. (2006). The Human Rights of Companies. 
Exploring the Structure of ECHR Protection. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 164-171. 
71 Markt Intern Verlag v Germany Ser A 195 (1989) (Court), para 33. 
72 Markt Intern Verlag v Germany Ser A 195 (1989) (Court), para 34. 
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‘political overtones’.73 Such was the case in Hertel V 
Switzerland where the appropriateness under Article 10(2) 
ECHR of court sanctioned injunctions sought by an 
association of manufactures against the applicant, who had 
violated domestic competition laws by publishing statements 
of the alleged hazards involved in the use of microwave 
ovens, was considered by the ECtHR. Since the statements 
concerned an ongoing debate of the effects of microwaves 
on human health, the Hertel claim was “substantially 
different from... markt intern” and it was therefore 
“necessary to reduce the extent of the margin of 
application” implied in that judgment. 
 Commercial expression with ‘political overtones’ will 
be subject to a more rigorous scrutiny:74 the ECtHR could 
also review whether the interference corresponds to a 
pressing social need and whether the interference is 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.75  
Thus, the claims put forward by Cooked-up, True-blue, 
and My Goodness may be considered purely commercial. 
Also Corn Rebel’s claim that its sweet corn is being ‘GM-free’ 
should be considered purely commercial, because Corn 
Rebel does not participate in a political debate by labelling 
their corn as ‘GM-free’ as such label does not make a 
statement about the hazards of GM-food for human health 
or the environment. 
 
(3.2a) The limitation must genuinely meet either objectives 
of general interest recognized by the EU  
                                                 
73Hertel V Switzerland Reports 1998-VI (1999) 28 EHRR 534, para 47.  
74 Emberland, M. (2006). The Human Rights of Companies. Exploring the 
Structure of ECHR Protection. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 170. 
75 Olsson v Sweden (A 130 (1988); 11 EHRR 259 para 67 PC. 
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In settled case-law of the ECJ fundamental rights of the EU 
may only be restricted for reasons that correspond to 
“objectives of general interest pursued by the 
Community”.76 Arguably these general interests are similar 
to the general interests in the field of free movement of 
goods, people, services and capital, which include the 
written grounds of Article 36, 45(4), 52, 62, and 65 TFEU 
(public morality, policy, or security; protection of health and 
life of humans, animals, or plants; protection of national 
treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological 
value; protection of industrial and commercial property) and 
unwritten grounds  in the public interest which are 
determined in the case law of the ECJ, including, amongst 
others, protection of public health,77 the defence of the 
consumer,78 and protection of the environment.79 
Furthermore, according to settled ECJ case law purely 
economic objectives cannot constitute an overriding reason 
in the public interest.80 The ECJ has held that the protection 
of health is an objective of general interest that follows from 
                                                 
76 ECJ Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609, para 18; Karlsson [2000] ECR I-2737, 
para 45. 
77 ECJ 6 September 2012 Case C-544/10 Weintor. 
78 Cassis de Dijon (120/78) [1979] E.C.R. 649; [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 494 at 
8. 
79 Aklagaren v Mickelsson and Roos (C-142/05) [2009] E.C.R. I-4273; 
[2009] All E.R. (EC) 842 at 32. 
80 See C-96/09 [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 21 at 48; C-436/00 [2002 E.C.R. I-
10829 at 50; C-35/98 [2000] E.C.R. I-4071; [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 48 at 
48. See Verica Trstenjak and Erwin Beysen (2013), “The Growing 
Overlap of Fundamental Freedoms and Fundamental Rights in the Case-
Law of the ECJ”, European Law Review 38(3), pp. 293-315, footnote 40.  
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Article 9 TFEU.81 Other objectives of general interest may 
include Article 7 to 12 TFEU (consistency between policies; 
eliminate inequalities/promote equality between men and 
women;  promotion of high level of employment; 
guaranteeing adequate social protection; fight against social 
exclusion; promotion of high level of education and training’ 
protection of human health; combatting discrimination 
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation; promoting sustainable 
development; protecting consumers). 
 
Or (3.2b) the limitation protects the rights and freedoms of 
others 
A food labelling regulation could also limit free speech to 
protect the rights of others, which could potentially include 
the right to health protection or the right to receive 
information. The ECJ seems to recognize a fundamental 
right to health protection from the second sentence of 
Article 35 EU Charter, which requires that “a high level of 
human health protection shall be ensured in the definition 
and implementation of all the Union's policies and 
activities”.82 Advocate General Jääskinen, who assessed for 
the first time so far commercial expression in the context of 
Article 11 EU Charter, also derived a fundamental right to 
health protection from Article 35 EU Charter.83 He further 
argued that this fundamental right to health protection must 
                                                 
81 Article 9 TFEU: “In defining and implementing its policies and 
activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the 
(...) protection of human health.” 
82 ECJ 6 September 2012 Case C-544/10 Weintor, para 47. 
83 Case C-249/09 Novo Nordisk AS v Ravimiamet, (Advocate General’s 
opinion 19 October 2010), footnote 21.  
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be safeguarded to guarantee the fundamental rights, human 
dignity, the right to life and the right to physical and mental 
integrity.84 He argued that the right to life, and as such the 
protection of health, must take precedence over the 
fundamental right to freedom of action, such as the freedom 
of expression.85  
Another fundamental right that may justify a limitation 
to free speech is the right to receive information as 
stipulated in Article 11 EU Charter. This right is especially 
important when free speech protection would also include 
the right not to speak. However, negative expression on 
food labels (such as Humble Honey’s refusal to disclose that 
its honey is ‘contaminated with genetically modified pollen’) 
will most likely not enjoy free speech protection in the EU 
(see paragraph 2.2). However, if free speech right would 
include the right not to speak, it is not clear whether this 
right to receive information could confer rights on 
consumers to demand disclosure of information on the food 
label. Article 169 TFEU recognizes that consumers have a 
right to information.86 This treaty provision does, however, 
not confer rights on consumers as such but it imposes an 
obligation on EU bodies to ensure a high level of consumer 
                                                 
84 Case C-249/09 Novo Nordisk AS v Ravimiamet, (Advocate General’s 
opinion 19 October 2010), para 49. 
85 Case C-249/09 Novo Nordisk AS v Ravimiamet, (Advocate General’s 
opinion 19 October 2010), para 50. He refers to Robert Alexy: ‘On 
Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison’, Ratio Juris Vol.16 
No 4. 2003 (433-449), p. 440. 
86 Article 169 TFEU: “In order to promote the interests of consumers and 
to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the Union shall contribute 
to protecting the health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as 
well as to promoting their right to information, education and to 
organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests.” 
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protection.87 Consumer protection, however, does seem to 
be acknowledged as a fundamental right of consumers in 
the EU, because Article 38 EU Charter stipulates that ‘Union 
policies must ensure a high level of consumer protection’.88 
However, Ehlers argues that besides the right of access to 
data “within the field of the Union’s fundamental rights, no 
room should be given to further increase the subjectivity of 
the idea of transparency.”89 
As a whole, the principle of proportionality seems similar to 
the requirement of Article 10(2) ECHR that the interference 
to freedom of expression must serve a legitimate aim. 
Unlike Article 52(1) EU Charter, that does not exhaustively 
lists the applicable general interests, Article 10(2) ECHR 
indicates what constitutes a legitimate aim, i.e. the 
interference must be in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for 
the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality 
of the judiciary. 90  
According to the explanations limitations to the right 
to freedom of expression allowed by Article 52(1) EU 
Charter may not exceed those provided for in Article 10(2) 
                                                 
87 Devenney, J. & Kenny. M (2012). European Consumer Protection: 
Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 349-50. 
88 Devenney, J. & Kenny. M (2012). European Consumer Protection: 
Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 350. 
89 Frank Schorkopf (2007), “Human Dignity, Fundamental Rights of 
Personality and Communication”, in: Dirk Ehlers (ed.), European 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, Berlin: De Gruyter Recht, p. 425. 
90 Article 10(2) ECHR. 
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ECHR.91 Government regulations that interfere with the 
freedom of expression must, therefore, at least meet one of 
the legitimate aims stipulated in Article 10(2) ECHR.92 Most 
government interferences could probably be placed under 
one of the legitimate aims mentioned in Article 10(2) ECHR 
as the grounds for interference are broad.93 It is, therefore, 
likely that when a food labelling regulation aims at 
protecting health it could be considered to be a legitimate 
aim under the ECHR.  
 
2.4. Conclusion 
In theory, the fundamental right to freedom of expression 
seems open to food businesses and applies to all types of 
expression, arguably including expression on food labels. In 
practice, the fundamental rights protection of food 
businesses for communications on the food label to be 
limited. 
Government limitations to Cooked-up utterly false 
claim, that its canned macaroni and cheese dinners are 
healthy, will likely be considered necessary. It will be more 
difficult for the government to justify limitations to Corn 
                                                 
91 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ 
C303/17, explanation on Article 11- Freedom of expression and 
information, para 1, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:303:0017:0035
:EN:PDF. 
92 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ 
C303/17, explanation on Article 11- Freedom of expression and 
information, para 1, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:303:0017:0035
:EN:PDF. 
93 Harris, D., O'Boyle, M., & Warbick, C. (2007). Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (2 ed.). London: Butterworths, p. 348. 
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Rebel’s, True-blue’s or My Goodness’s claim. In these cases, 
disclaimers may be preferred as long as the disclaimer has 
the same effectiveness as a complete ban of the 
information. Limitations should, however, be placed under 
one of the legitimate aims stipulated in Article 10(2) ECHR. 
Limitations based on health protection could probably easily 
be placed under Article 10(2) ECHR. This will, however, be 
more difficult when the limitation is based on protecting the 
consumer right to information. However, it seems that such 
a right will not be relevant in the context of free speech in 
the EU, as it is most likely that businesses that refuses to 
disclose government mandated information on its label, 
such as Humble Honey’s refusal to label its honey as 
‘contaminated with genetically modified pollen’, will not 
enjoy free speech protection.  
 
3. Free Speech Protection in the United States of 
America 
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . .”94 Corporate 
entities are afforded, subject to the limits discussed below, 
First Amendment protection.95  
3.1 Scope of Free Speech Protection of 
Communications on Food Labels in the USA 
The degree to which content on food labels may enjoy First 
Amendment protection depends on whether the speech can 
                                                 
94 U.S. CONST., AMEND. 1 (1791). 
95 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 (1978). 
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be categorized as commercial speech, because commercial 
speech receives limited protection.96 
Commercial speech was carved out by the Supreme 
Court in 1976 in Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council,97 and in 1980 in Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.98 The 
Court defined commercial speech as “speech with does no 
more than propose a commercial transaction”99 or is 
“related solely to the economic interest of the speaker and 
its audience.”100 This implies that both parties should have 
an economic interest in the speech,101 which excludes 
books, newspapers, and magazines, read for its political, 
literary, or other public interest content, from the scope of 
commercial expression.102  
The First Amendment also restricts the ability of the 
government to compel individuals to engage in certain 
                                                 
96 Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
97 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). 
98 Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 
447 U.S. 557 (1980). It is interesting to note that in 1942, the Court in 
Valentine v. Chrestenen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), held that commercial 
speech was not protected by the First Amendment. “We are equally 
clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as 
respects purely commercial advertising.” Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54. 
99 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). 
100 Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
101 Eric Barendt (2005), Freedom of Speech, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 396 
102 Eric Barendt (2005), Freedom of Speech, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 396 
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expressive activities, as such free speech protection also 
includes the right not to speak.103 With respect to disclosure 
requirements in the realm of commercial speech, such as 
Humble Honey’s compelled claim that its honey 
‘contaminated with genetically modified pollen’, the 
Supreme Court made clear that such negative commercial 
speech does also enjoy First Amendment protection.104 
Most importantly, the commercial expression relates 
solely to the economic interests. As such, Cooked-up’s false 
claim that its canned macaroni and cheese dinner ‘contains 
all the nutrients needed for a long and healthy life’, True-
blue’s claim that Vitamin C is added to its Blueberrylicious 
treats, My Goodness claim that ‘the consumption of bifidus 
eases the digestive system’, and Humble Honey’s refusal to 
label its honey as being ‘contaminated with genetically 
modified pollen’ will thus likely be considered commercial 
speech. 
This may be different for Corn Rebel‘s political claim 
that its sweet corn is being ‘GM-free’105 as such information 
may not be provided solely for economic reasons, but takes 
a line on political questions or makes a contribution to the 
formation of public opinion.106 It seems, however, that the 
                                                 
103 West Virginia Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 
(1943); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 795 (1977). 
104 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
105 Another issue with ‘GM-free’ claims on corn is that it is difficult to 
guarantee that there would be no contamination with GM corns. If there 
is contamination the claim of GM-free would be false and thus not 
protected unless political speech.   
106 Eric Barendt (2005), Freedom of Speech, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 396-7. Barendt refers to the German Supreme Constitutional 
Court 102 BverfGE 347, 359-60 (2001) who held that the civil courts 
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courts may not want to take it that far. A Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that press releases by the National 
Commission on Egg Nutrition, a producers’ consortium, on a 
matter of current controversy, that there was no scientific 
evidence that egg consumption increased heart diseases, 
were considered commercial speech,107 even though it was 
not clear whether these press releases related solely to the 
economic interest. 108 Furthermore, in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky109 
the question was whether Nike’s response, in the form of 
press releases and letters to newspapers, university 
presidents, and athletics directors regarding allegations that 
the company was mistreating and underpaying workers 
outside the USA could be classified commercial speech. The 
Supreme Court of California did categorize the speech as 
commercial and, therefore, the response would not enjoy 
First Amendment protection if found false or misleading. The 
majority of the Supreme Court, however, held that the case 
was not yet ripe for full consideration. In his dissent, Judge 
Breyer argued that the responses were in form and content 
public, rather than commercial speech, because the 
responses by Nike were not made in an advertising format, 
did not propose sales, and concerned an important matter 
of public controversy—the criticism of its employment 
                                                                                                                            
were wrong to interpret Benetton pictorial advertisements protesting 
against environmental damage, the employment of children, and the 
spread of AIDS as solely intended to promote the company’s economic 
interest. 
107 FTC v National Commission on Egg Nutrition 517 F 2d 485.  
108 See also Eric Barendt (2005), Freedom of Speech, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 397. 
109 Nike Inc. v Marc Kasky 123 S Ct 2554 (2003). 
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practices.110 He added that the form and content 
distinguishes the speech at issue from purely commercial 
speech such as “speech—say, the words "dolphin-safe 
tuna"—that commonly appears in more traditional 
advertising or labelling contexts.” In a Petitioners’ brief it 
was also argued that  
 
“If the asserted tie-in between a state’s regulatory 
power and the moral conclusions of consumers ever 
suffices to convert discussion of public issues into 
lesser protected “commercial speech,” that can only 
be in the context of direct product advertising and 
product labels, which are least likely to generate 
reasoned discussion and which are targeted at 
consumers and affect purchasing decisions in the first 
instance and shape broader moral judgments only 
secondarily.”111  
 
Although, the Supreme Court has not yet decided on the 
issue whether commercial expression needs to relate solely 
to the economic interest, it is likely that Corn Rebel’s claim 
that their sweet corn is being ‘GM-free’, will be categorized 
as commercial speech.  
3.2. Limitations to the Free Speech Rights of 
Food Businesses on Food Labels in the USA 
To determine whether commercial speech would enjoy First 
Amendment protection, the Supreme Court articulated in 
Central Hudson, a four-part test. First (1), the speech must 
                                                 
110 Nike Inc. v Marc Kasky 123 S Ct 2554 (2003). See also Eric Barendt 
(2005), Freedom of Speech, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 398. 
111 Brief for the petitioners, No. 02-575, at 36. 
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concern lawful activity and not be misleading.112 The Court 
has long held that expression likely to deceive113 or related 
to illegal activity114 is not protected speech. Second (2), the 
Court will inquire whether the government has asserted a 
substantial interest in regulating the commercial speech at 
issue.115 Common examples of a substantial government 
interest include preventing consumer confusion,116 
protecting national security,117 life, health and safety.118 The 
government bears the burden to “demonstrate that the 
harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact 
alleviate them to a material degree”.119 However, the 
Supreme Court held that when the government restricts 
truthful, non-misleading commercial speech for reasons 
“unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process” 
strict scrutiny should apply.120 Although strict scrutiny is 
almost always fatal to the challenged government 
restriction, a Court will uphold the constraint on speech if it 
                                                 
112 Id. At 566. 
113 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979) (restricting misleading 
use of trade names). 
114 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 388 
(1973) (restricting sexually discriminatory advertisement for 
employment). 
115 Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
116 Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
117 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). 
118 See U.S. Const. preamble & amend V. See also, Stephen E. Gottlieb, 
Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term 
in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U.L. REV. 917, 948 (1988) 
(discussing compelling government interest in life, health and safety). 
119 Edenfield v. Fane 507 U.S. 761 (1993). 
120 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island 17 U.S. 484 (1996).  
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is “necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling 
state interest.”121 
If the answer to the first two questions is yes, the 
Court will then (3) determine “whether the regulation 
directly advances the governmental interest asserted” 122 
and (4) “whether it is not more extensive than necessary to 
serve that interest.”123 The government needs to establish 
that the regulation on speech is “narrowly tailored to 
achieve the desired objective.”124 The government may 
prohibit inherently misleading advertising, but cannot place 
an absolute prohibition on potentially misleading 
information, if the information may be presented in a way, 
such as the use of a disclaimer, that is not deceptive.125  
Whether information may be considered potentially 
misleading and, therefore, require a disclaimer was 
discussed by Court of Appeals with respect to health 
claims126 that have some scientific support, such as My 
Goodness’s claim that ‘the consumption of bifidus eases the 
digestive system’, but do not satisfy the Food and Drug 
Administration’s (FDA) “significant scientific agreement” 
                                                 
121 Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 
761 (1995); Perry Ed. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 
37, 45 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980). 
122 Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
123 Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
124 Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). 
125 In re R.M.J. 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982). 
126 Health claims describe a relationship between a nutrient, such as 
calcium, and a disease or health-related condition, such as osteoporosis. 
21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(1)(B). 
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standard.127 In Pearson I, a Court of Appeals noted that in 
cases of incomplete advertising, the message is not 
inherently misleading (and thus properly restricted) but 
rather potentially misleading, and that the preferred remedy 
is more disclosure rather than an outright prohibition.128 The 
Court of Appeals held, however, that a disclaimer would not 
have been necessary when (1) evidence in support of the 
claim is qualitatively weaker than evidence against the 
claim; or (2) evidence in support of the claim is outweighed 
by evidence against the claim.129 In Pearson II, a Court of 
Appeals added that although there was an absence of 
significant evidence in support of the claim, this does not 
mean that it is negative evidence against the claim.130 The 
Court of Appeals added in Pearson II that disclaimers are 
not necessary when the government demonstrates “with 
empirical evidence that disclaimers would bewilder 
consumers and fail to correct for deceptiveness”.131 In 
Whitaker, the Court of Appeals found that health claims on 
dietary supplements considering treating of a disease 
instead of reducing disease risk is unlawful, and therefore 
fail the first part of the Central Hudson test.132   
 Thus, when food businesses want to put content on 
their food label, such as Cooked-up, Corn Rebel, True-blue, 
and My Goodness, the Central Hudson test most likely would 
                                                 
127 The FDA implemented a rule that required “significant scientific 
agreement” regarding the link between the claimed nutrient and health 
impact before allowing use of the claim on a food or supplement label. 
See 21 C.F.R. § 101.14; 21 C.F.R. § 101.70. 
128 Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
129 Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
130 Pearson v. Shalala, 130 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2001). 
131 Pearson v. Thompson, 141 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2001). 
132 Whitaker, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 54. 
Wageningen UR (University & Research centre) For quality of life 53 
39 
 
apply. This may be different for Humble Honey’s refusal to 
label its honey as being ‘contaminated with genetically 
modified pollen’.  Although the government may require 
food businesses to place labels on their products to regulate 
commerce133 or protect the liberty interests of other 
members of society134 some examples of challenges to 
government compelled speech through disclaimers exist 
mainly in the biotechnology context (Amestoy case and 
Boggs case) and tobacco warning labels (Discount Tobacco 
case and R.J. Reynolds case). 
In the Amestoy case a Court of Appeals invalidated 
Vermont’s mandatory disclosure requirements for dairy 
products derived from cows treated with a genetically 
engineered version of bovine somatotropin,135 commonly 
referred to as rBST.136 The Court of Appeals applied the 
Central Hudson test and held that Vermont has failed to 
establish that its interests are substantial.137 The Court held 
that the dairy producers and retailers had a First 
Amendment right not to speak unless the state could 
establish a substantial interest for labelling rBST derived 
                                                 
133 See e.g., U.S. v. 40 Cases, More or Less, Pinocchio Brand 75% Corn, 
Peanut Oil and Soya Bean Oil Blended with 25% Pure Olive Oil, 289 F.2d 
343, 345 (2d Cir. 1961) (“The interest of the federal government in 
ensuring that such food meets minimum standards of purity and is not 
misbranded arises out of its supervisory function over interstate 
commerce.”). 
134 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905). 
135 Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, also known as recombinant 
Bovine Growth Hormone (rGBH), is a synthetic growth hormone that 
increases milk production by cows. 
136 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 2754 (terminated by 1993, Adj. Sess., No. 
127, § 4, as amended by 1997, No. 61 § 272i, eff. Mar. 30, 1998). 
137 International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2nd 
Cir. 1996) at 73. 
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products.138 Vermont argued that its statute supported a 
“strong consumer interest and the public’s ‘right to 
know’.”139 The Court, however, held that a “substantial state 
interest” cannot be established based merely on consumer 
curiosity.140  
In Boggs, the Court of Appeals did not invalidate 
Ohio’s mandatory disclosure requirements; albeit that this 
time the mandatory disclosure requirements considered 
dairy products derived from cows not treated with rBST. In 
Ohio such products should be accompanied by a disclaimer 
stating that “The FDA had determined that no significant 
difference has been shown between milk derived from rBST-
supplemented and non-rBST-supplemented cows”.141 The 
Court of Appeals used the Zauderer test to assess whether 
the rule was in conflict with the First Amendment.142 In 
                                                 
138 Id. at 71. 
139 Id. at 73. 
140 Id. The Amestoy opinion included a vigorous dissent asserting that 
the state interest was not limited to consumer curiosity, but also 
substantive concerns regarding rBST’s impact on the heath of humans 
and cows, the financial sustainability of small farms, and general 
concerns regarding the manipulation of nature using biotechnology. Id. 
at 74. The proper question, in the dissent’s view, is whether the 
Constitution prohibits government from mandating disclosure of truthful, 
relevant information to promote informed consumer choice. Id. Although 
the Second Circuit opinion certainly leaves open the possibility that 
mandatory labelling could pass constitutional muster if the state 
advanced a more substantive interest, a generalized interest in 
satisfying consumer curiosity appears to be a losing argument for states 
attempting to mandate labelling of otherwise scientifically 
indistinguishable products. Rather, the court relegated process-based 
labelling decisions to market forces. 
141 60 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 901:11-8 (2008). 
142 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).  
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Zauderer, the Supreme Court expressed a lighter standard 
than the Central Hudson test, applying only to disclosure 
requirements. In Zauderer the Supreme Court held that the 
government may compel disclosure requirements associated 
with product marketing, so long as the disclosure is (1) 
purely factual and uncontroversial; (2) reasonably related to 
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers; 
and (3) not unjustified or unduly burdensome.143 
Accordingly, in Boggs the Court concluded that the use of a 
disclaimer accompanying the production claim could 
eliminate any consumer confusion and was, therefore, 
considered not to violate the First Amendment even though 
it compelled food businesses to speak.144  
Cases in the context of tobacco warning labels 
illustrate the difficulty in determining whether the compelled 
commercial speech at issue is purely factual and 
uncontroversial. The Discount Tobacco case concerned 
labelling restrictions on tobacco products —specifically the 
use of colour graphics depicting the negative health 
consequences of smoking along with textual warning 
labels.145 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also 
based its decision on Zauderer and upheld the graphic-
warning requirement because the factual information (i.e., 
colour graphics) regarding the health risks of using tobacco 
                                                 
143 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
144 Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2010). 
145 See Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 
509 (6th Cir. 2012), cert denied American Snuff Company, LLC v. United 
States, 133 S.Ct. 1996 (2013) (facial challenge to the statute); R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Administration, 696 F.3d 1205 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (applied challenge to the actual graphics selected by 
the FDA). 
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are reasonably related to the alleviation of potential 
consumer confusion.146 In contrast, the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals in R.J. Reynolds, held that the graphic warnings 
required under the Act went beyond a full disclosure 
requirement as in Zauderer, to prevent consumer deception, 
but rather required a general disclosure about the negative 
health effects of smoking—thus amounting to a warning and 
discouragement to consumers to purchase products rather 
than rectify specific deceptive statements.147 Accordingly, 
the Court applied the more restrictive Central Hudson test—
finding that the government failed to present any evidence 
that the proposed graphics would accomplish the stated goal 
of reducing smoking rates.  
Whether the rational basis test outlined in Zauderer 
and applied in Discount Tobacco and Boggs, would apply to 
Humble Honey’s refusal to label its honey as being 
‘contaminated with genetically modified pollen’, or whether 
the intermediate scrutiny test established in Central Hudson 
and applied in R.J. Reynolds and Amestoy would apply may 
depend on whether the compelled commercial speech solely 
aims at informing consumers (and is thus purely factual and 
uncontroversial) or whether the compelled commercial 
speech aims at altering consumer choice (and is, therefore, 
not purely factual and uncontroversial).148  
                                                 
146 Discount Tobacco, 674 F. 3d at 569. 
147 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216. 
148 See for a more detailed analysis Jennifer M. Keighley, "Can You 
Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First 
Amendment", 15 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional 
Law 539 (2012). 
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3.3 Conclusion 
The Supreme Court had not yet clarified the meaning of 
commercial speech, but it is likely that corporate 
communications on food labels will be categorized as 
commercial speech. This opens the way for food businesses 
to challenge government regulations limiting corporate 
communications on food labels.  
Cooked-up, Corn Rebel, True-blue, My Goodness and 
Humble Honey will likely be considered commercial speech. 
Cooked-up will probably not enjoy First Amendment 
protection as its claim that its canned macaroni and cheese 
dinner ‘contains all the nutrients needed for a long and 
healthy life’ is likely inherently misleading. The claims made 
by Corn Rebel, True-blue, My Goodness, and Humble 
Honey’s refusal to label its honey as being ‘contaminated 
with genetically modified pollen’ may be considered 
potentially misleading, provided the government can 
demonstrate a substantial interest, and may, therefore, 
require a disclaimer.  
 
4. Comparing the different approaches to free 
speech protection on food labels in the USA and 
the EU. 
I will compare the different approaches towards free speech 
protection on food labels in the EU and the US. First (1) I 
will compare the different approaches to whether corporate 
entities enjoy free speech protection. Second (2), I will 
compare whether food labels fall within the scope of free 
speech protection. Third (3), I will compare whether 
compelled expression enjoys free speech protection. 
Although food labels may enjoy free speech protection, this 
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right may still be limited. I will, therefore, (4) assess the 
different approach towards which limits can be set to free 
speech.  
 
4.1. To speak or not to speak: the freedom of 
companies to express themselves 
Initially, in the USA the Amendments to the Constitution 
were seen as human rights, understood to apply to natural 
persons only. Over time, case law expanded the scope of 
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to include corporate entities.149 Within the EU certain 
fundamental rights, arguably including the freedom of 
expression, also extend to corporate entities.  
 
4.2. Expression on the food label. Does the food 
label have what it takes? 
In the EU and the USA expressions on food labels seem to 
enjoy free speech protection.  
 
4.3. Can Humble Honey stay humble? Whether 
free speech includes the right not to speak 
The extent to which free speech includes the right not to 
speak, such as Humble Honey’s refusal to  label its honey as 
being ‘contaminated with genetically modified pollen’, 
differed per jurisdiction. In the USA compelled expression on 
food labels does enjoy free speech protection. However, 
                                                 
149 See, Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of 
Free Speech and Corporative Personhood in Citizens United, Case 
Western Reserve Law Review [Vol. 61:2 2001], p. 495–548 (and 
sources quoted there). 
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purely factual and uncontroversial compelled expression on 
food labels aimed at informing consumers may be subject to 
a lighter review than compelled expression on food labels 
aiming at altering consumer choice. In the EU it is less clear 
whether free speech includes the right not to disclose 
information on food labels. Although the ECtHR found that 
journalists have a right not to speak, it is not self-evident 
that the same would apply to information on food labels as 
that type of information serves a fundamentally different 
purpose. Furthermore, the approach of the ECJ towards 
whether free speech includes a right not to speak is yet 
unclear.  
 
4.4. Put the lid on: how free speech on food 
labels can be limited 
To determine whether expressions can be limited, USA 
courts differentiate between types of expression: 
commercial speech has a limited First Amendment 
protection than political speech. The claims made by 
Cooked-up, Corn Rebel, True-blue, Blueberrylicious, My 
Goodness, and Humble Honey’s refusal to add a disclaimer 
will most likely be considered commercial speech. Which 
test will most likely will be applied may depend on the type 
of commercial speech, mainly whether it concerns voluntary 
speech or compelled speech through disclaimers. Central 
Hudson test will likely be applied to Cooked-up, Corn Rebel, 
True-blue, Blueberrylicious, and My Goodness. This implies 
that commercial speech that is not misleading or unlawful 
may be limited when the government has a substantial 
interest to regulate the speech; when the limitation is 
necessary; and when the limitation is narrowly tailored to 
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achieve the desired objective.150 A lighter Zauderer test may 
be applied to disclosure requirements, such as that the 
government compels Humble Honey’s to label its honey as 
being ‘contaminated with genetically modified pollen’. The 
Zauderer test implies that he government may compel 
disclosure requirements associated with product marketing, 
so long as the disclosure is (1) purely factual and 
uncontroversial; (2) reasonably related to the State’s 
interest in preventing deception of consumers; and (3) not 
unjustified or unduly burdensome.151  
In the EU an overarching limitations clause applies to 
all types of expression. From the EU Charter, ECJ case-law, 
and ECtHR case-law it can be derived that limitations to free 
speech in the EU have to be provided for by law, must 
respect the essence of the fundamental right at issue, must 
serve a legitimate aim, and must be necessary.152 The case 
law of the ECtHR, which may be taken into account by the 
ECJ when assessing freedom of expression, differentiated 
commercial expression from other types of expression when 
it assessed the necessity of the limitation. Basically the 
ECtHR granted the governmental authorities a wider margin 
of appreciation when assessing the necessity of a limitation 
to commercial expression compared to political expression. 
This margin may become narrower when the commercial 
expression has ‘political overtones’. It seems reasonable to 
expect that a similar approach as to the ECtHR will be used 
by the ECJ. Theoretically, it would also be conceivable that 
the ECJ as court of a union rooted in economic 
                                                 
150 Although this latest step seems to be eroding. 
151 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
152 So-called principle of proportionality. 
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considerations, would value commercial expression higher 
than the ECtHR does. At present, however, there is no 
evidence pointing in this direction.  
Food labelling regulations limiting free speech with a 
view to protect public health seems to be generally regarded 
as legitimate to limit food labels in the analysed legal 
systems. Disclosure requirements seem to be always 
preferred in the USA and the EU over an outright prohibition 
as long as such a disclaimer has the same effectiveness as a 
prohibition. 
 
5. Food businesses as guardians of food 
information? To what extent do functions of free 
speech allow free speech protection of 
communications on food labels  
The degree to which free speech may be protected may 
differ depending on (1) whether the corporate nature of the 
speaker justifies free speech protection on food labels, or 
(2) whether it is the interest of the consumer, or (3) a 
public interest.153 Practice in the EU and the USA shows that 
commercial statements enjoy limited protection compared 
to political statements. It is, therefore, important to 
consider (4) to what extent the nature of corporate 
communications on food labels may be considered political 
                                                 
153 See for a more general discussion on free speech protection Thomas 
I. Emerson (1963), “Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment”, 
72 Yale Law Journal, pp. 877-956; and Eric Barendt (2005) Freedom of 
Speech, Oxford: Oxford University Press; For a more detailed discussion 
on corporate commercial free speech protection see Roger A. Shiner 
(2003), Freedom of Commercial Expression, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press; and Tamara R. Piety (2007-2008), “Against Freedom of 
Commercial Expression”, 29(6) Cardozo Law Review, pp 2583-2684. 
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or commercial. Finally, I will consider (5) whether corporate 
free speech protection on food labels should include the 
right not to speak. 
 
5.1. I think, therefore I am: the corporate nature 
of the speaker as justification for corporate free 
speech. 
Most of the purposes and interests of free speech protection 
do not justify the protection of corporate speech on food 
labels based on the corporate nature of the speaker.154 
Freedom of expression as a function of self-fulfilment and 
citizen participation in democracy seems to be a personal 
right that should only be applicable to human beings, as 
companies have no human dignity nor are capable of self-
fulfilment. When corporate speech is political in nature, 
however, it can be argued that the tendency of 
governments to suppress radical or subversive ideas might 
justify corporate free speech protection on food labels.  
 
5.2. Give me more: consumer interest to receive 
information as justification for corporate free 
speech 
The corporate right to free speech could also be justified 
based on the consumer interest to receive the information. 
                                                 
154 See for a more general discussion on free speech protection Thomas 
I. Emerson (1963), “Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment”, 
72 Yale Law Journal, pp. 877-956; and Eric Barendt (2005) Freedom of 
Speech, Oxford: Oxford University Press; For a more detailed discussion 
on corporate commercial free speech protection see Roger A. Shiner 
(2003), Freedom of Commercial Expression, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press; and Tamara R. Piety (2007-2008), “Against Freedom of 
Commercial Expression”, 29(6) Cardozo Law Review, pp 2583-2684. 
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155 If the food business is not allowed to give the 
information the consumer interest to receive the information 
is not met. It could be argued that the consumer interest to 
receive information demands that governments should not 
restrict corporate communication on food labels to protect 
the consumer right to make fundamental choices concerning 
their life, an important aspect of self-fulfilment.156 This 
argument would only apply when consumers demand 
information, which the food business is not legally allowed 
to provide. Especially Corn Rebel’s claim that its sweet corn 
is being ‘GM-free’ enables consumers to only consume food 
products that fit within their lifestyle, i.e. foods that are not 
genetically modified. A similar argument would be more 
difficult to make for True-blue’s claim that Vitamin C has 
been added to its Blueberrylicious or My Goodness’s claim 
that ‘the consumption of bifidus eases the digestive system’. 
Furthermore, consumer interests to receive the information 
cannot justify a corporate right not to speak, such as 
Humble Honey’s honey compelled disclosure that its honey 
is ‘contaminated with genetically modified pollen’.  
 
5.3. The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth: public interest in the free flow of 
information as justification for corporate free 
speech 
The value of truth can be supported “by utilitarian 
considerations concerning progress and the development of 
                                                 
155 Eric Barendt (2005) Freedom of Speech, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 25. 
156 Eric Barendt (2005) Freedom of Speech, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 401-2 who refers to the Canadian Supreme Court decision Ford 
v. A-G of Quebec [1988[ 2 SCR 712, 767. 
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society”.157 From this it follows that the government should 
not regulate expression as this constitutes an interruption of 
the free flow of information. Interruption of the free flow of 
information has the potential that false information cannot 
be rebutted, which is harmful to society as a whole.  
 The free flow of false information, such as Cooked-
up’s false claim that its canned macaroni and cheese dinner 
‘contains all the nutrients needed for a long and healthy 
life’, is harmful to society: (1) false information increases 
the search costs for consumers to find good-quality goods; 
(2) the public might be incentivized to consume more 
canned macaroni and cheese dinners which is harmful to 
public health; and (3) food businesses will not be 
incentivized to innovate or improve their products in order 
to make truthful, non-misleading claims that appeal to 
consumers, because every competitor can make similar 
claims without it even being true. 
 This is different for claims that are in itself not false, 
such as Corn Rebel’s claim that its sweet corn is being ‘GM-
free’, True-blue’s claim that Vitamin C has been added to its 
treats, and My Goodness’s claim that ‘the consumption of 
bifidus eases the digestive system’. All seem to serve the 
public interest in the free flow of information i.e. lowering 
consumer search costs to make an optimal decision and 
promoting competition by stimulating the innovation and 
improvement of food products. In such a way both should 
also fall within the scope of free speech. Whether corporate 
information lowers consumer search costs to make an 
optimal decision can, however, be questioned as the amount 
of information consumers are exposed to is increased. This 
                                                 
157 Eric Barendt (2005) Freedom of Speech, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 7. 
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may result in information overload. Information overload 
actually increases search costs and could make it more 
difficult for consumers to process the information on the 
food label to make an informed choice of sufficient 
quality.158  Consumer search costs to make an optimal 
decision might, therefore, be lowered with the limitation of 
the amount of information on food labels. If the government 
is not able to prove that consumers will be better enabled to 
make an optimal decision by withholding the information 
from the food label, the corporate information should fall 
within the scope of free speech protection. 
 
5.4. Commercial or political? The nature of 
corporate communication on food labels 
Some food businesses, such as Corn Rebel, might address 
topics through their food labels that are part of public 
debate, e.g. GMO/child labour/animal cruelty is bad, by 
informing the consumer that their food product is free from 
these qualities (e.g. Corn Rebel’s claim that its sweet corn is 
being ‘GM-free’). It can be argued that the single statement 
that a product is free from qualities that might be 
considered bad by part of the public contributes as such to 
the public debate. There are much more obvious and more 
effective ways, however, to communicate political 
standpoints that certain qualities are bad than stating on 
food labels that the product does not contain that quality. 
This makes it difficult to argue that the main purpose of the 
corporate communication on the food label is political. Most 
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food labels are, therefore, mainly commercial in nature as 
they are primarily targeted at affecting consumer 
purchasing decisions.  
 
5.5. Has Humble Honey a free speech right not to 
speak? 
The right not to speak is “closely linked with freedom of 
belief and conscience and with underlying rights to human 
dignity, which would be seriously compromised by a legal 
requirement to enunciate opinions which are not in truth 
held by the individual.”159 As food businesses have no 
‘human dignity’ it is hard to justify that food businesses 
have a free speech right not to disclose information. 
Furthermore, the consumer interest to receive information 
does not justify a corporate right not to disclose information 
on food labels. The public interest in the free flow of 
commercial information could, however, justify a corporate 
right not to disclose information when the food business can 
prove that the compelled information will increase consumer 
search cost to make an informed choice of sufficient 
quality.160 If the food business can prove this, the compelled 
claim should fall within the scope of free speech.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The communications made by Cooked-up, Corn Rebel, True-
Blue, and My Goodness on their food labels will most likely 
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enjoy, subject to limitations, free speech protection in the 
EU and the US. Such right can only be justified from the 
perspective of consumer or public interest. Humble Honey 
will most likely not enjoy a right to free speech in the EU, 
while this seems to be different in the US.  Withholding 
information from consumers should, however, in general not 
fall within the scope of commercial speech protection 
because it generally does not serve the consumer or public 
interest in receiving information. This implies that Humble 
Honey has to speak up; at least as far as its free speech 
rights are concerned, except when Humble Honey can prove 
that the compelled information will increase consumer 
search costs to make an optimal decision. 
 Despite the right of free speech, the communications 
of Cooked-up can be banned in the USA and the EU because 
the government has a substantial interest in doing so. A 
complete ban of information may be necessary for utterly 
false claims, however, the claims made by Corn Rebel, True-
blue, and My Goodness are not utterly false. Subject to 
substantial government interest, e.g. protecting public 
health, such claims can be prohibited, although it is most 
likely that a disclaimer will be required in the USA and the 
EU for these types of expressions as long as such a 
disclaimer will not increase consumer search costs to make 
an optimal decision.  
 In sum, food businesses should not be the guardians 
of information on food labels; their free speech rights on 
food labels should only be based on public and consumer 
interests. Only when the information serves the public or 
consumer interests, free speech protection should step in. 
